Battle for the Bulge:  The Reclaiming Seller vs. the Floating Lien Creditor by Tabac, William
Cleveland State University 
EngagedScholarship@CSU 
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship 
2001 
Battle for the Bulge: The Reclaiming Seller vs. the Floating Lien 
Creditor 
William Tabac 
Cleveland State University, w.tabac@csuohio.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
Publisher's Statement 
This work originally appeared at 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 509(2001). 
Original Citation 
William Tabac, Battle for the Bulge: The Reclaiming Seller vs. the Floating Lien Creditor, 2001 Columbia 
Business Law Review 509 (2001) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of 
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu. 
Citation: 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 509 2001 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Fri Oct  5 14:14:45 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0898-0721
BATTLE FOR THE BULGE:
THE RECLAIMING SELLER VS. THE
FLOATING LIEN CREDITOR
William Louis Tabac*
I. Code Buyers: Purchasers of Title .............................. 514
A. Rights and Powers to Transfer Title Under
Articles 2 and 2A ................................................. 519
B. Power to Sell Under Articles 3 and 8 .................. 521
II. Much Less Than Title: Code Lessees And Secured
Parties ........................................................................ 523
III. How the Code Has Been Misread .............................. 526
IV. Resolving The Conflict ............................................... 535
V . Conclusion ................................................................. 538
Trade credit is a very big business1 and an important
source of financing.2 Its low costs make it attractive to
small businesses with limited resources.3 Unlike secured
creditors, who insist on cushions to support their longer-
Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A. Case-
Western Reserve University (1962), J.D., George Washington University
(1966). My thanks to the Cleveland-Marshall Fund which awarded me a
research grant for this article, and to Professor Thomas D. Buckley for
his helpful comments about it.
1 Live Capital, one trade creditor, reportedly offers such credit to
Staples and Microsoft amounting to approximately $4 billion.
Staples.com Expands Services Offering to Empower Small Business, Bus.
WIRE, INC., Nov. 6, 2000.
2 Professor Garvin estimates that $6 trillion in trade credit is
extended each year and that $30 billion in goods is subject to
reclamation. Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law
of Sales: The Credit Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247,
251 (1996).
3 See Emma Tucker, Small Business Finance is 'Shaky,' FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 1, 1993, at 8.
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term debts,4 trade creditors who sell goods, like the small
businesses they support, are risk-takers. They deliver their
goods on cheap, short-term, unsecured credit, trusting their
debtors to pay up.5
A trade creditor is more likely to lend, and to lend more
than a secured creditor. 6 The service they perform for the
economy is so valuable that these entrepreneurs are subsi-
dized under federal and state law.7 Bankruptcy-bound
debtors can prefer them8 and the Uniform Commercial
Code9 gives them a lien even when they have not asked for
one.
The lien arises under Article 2. Trade creditors may re-
claim the sold goods if they learn that their buyer has re-
ceived them while insolvent. 0 This is the only security that
the Code gives them, and it is lost if the goods are resold to
4 Id. (small companies are shunned by banks because of low ratio
of fixed assets.)
5 "Small creditors, such as trade creditors... are not normally in a
position to do a full investigation or to negotiate guarantees. Rather,
they tend to rely on the business's appearance of substance..."
Consumer's Co-op of Walworth Co. v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 217 n.3
(Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
6 Where a secured lender will advance against a certain percentage
of the value of the collateral, a reclaiming seller will advance the entire
value. See Graeme S. Cooper, The Reclamation Rights of Unpaid and
Unsecured Sellers in International Trade, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 17,
26 (1987).
7 See U.C.C. § 2-702 (1989). Moreover, the lien is recognized in
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 546 (1994). "The purpose of [Section 546] is
to recognize, in part, the validity of Section 2-702 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which has generated much litigation, confusion, and
divergent decisions in different circuits." S. REP. No. 95-989, at 86-87
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5872-73.
8 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(1994). The provision is "a means of
encouraging normal credit transactions and the continuation of short-
term credit dealings with troubled debtors so as to stall rather than
hasten bankruptcy." In re Fred Hawes Org., Inc., 957 F.2d 239, 243 (6th
Cir. 1992).
9 Hereinafter referred to as the "Code." Specific sections are
referred to as "section X-XXX." All citations are to the Official Text
unless otherwise indicated.
10 § 2-702(2).
[Vol. 2001
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unknowing buyers."' But the protection extends beyond
their immediate buyer to other kinds of purchasers who
claim through that buyer. The defaulting buyer might, for
example, serve merely as a middleman by channeling the
goods to a lessee under a prearranged lease contract.
i 2 If
so, the lessee's position is no stronger than his defaulting
lessor's. Only "subsequent" lessees, those who commit
themselves after the goods have been sold to their lessor,
will prevail. The Uniform Commercial Code so provides.13
Secured creditors also feed off of a buyer's ownership.
The priority contest with the secured creditor, however,
may have a different ending than it does with the lessee.
The floating lien creditor, for example, prevails even though
his debtor would be forced to yield to the seller.14 This,
even though no advances were made against the sold good
and no foreclosure occurred. 15 Because of a failure to file,
the seller may have been unaware that the floating lienor
existed,16 and the floating lien creditor may have been
equally ignorant about the existence of the sold goods.' 7
Under the prevailing view, the secured creditor's lack of
reliance on the sold goods is of no consequence: the unpaid
seller still loses. However, the Code does not provide for
11 See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1989).
12 The so-called "finance lease." U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) (1999). A
finance lease is the "functional equivalent of an extension of credit"
where "[t]he lessor is the financial middleman between the supplier and
the lessee." Mojica v. Citibank N.A., 853 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D. Puerto Rico
1994) (quoting Meyers Bros. v. Gelco, 114 D.P.R. 116, 154-55 (1983)).
13 U.C.C. § 2A-304 (2000).
,4 Matter of Samuels & Co., Inc., 526 F.2d 1238, 1246 (5th Cir.
1976) (en banc) is the leading case.
15 E.g., Lavonia Mfg. Co. v. Emery, 52 B.R. 944, 947 (E.D. PA.
1985).
16 First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Carbajal, 645 P.2d 830 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981), 645 P.2d 778 (en banc) (vacated on other grounds); Guy Martin
Buick, Inc. v. Colo. Springs Nat'l Bank, 519 P.2d 354, 356 (Colo. 1974).
17 An "unconscious purchaser." S. Richard Arnold, Note, The Cash
Seller's Right of Reclamation Versus The Secured Party's Floating Lien:
Who is Entitled to Priority? 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 277, 287 n.72 (1978).
The term was coined by Professor Robert Braucher. See Ven
Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M. L. REV.
435, 458 n.119 (1971).
No. 3:509]
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this outcome. It exists because of a misreading of the
Code's text. This view is also at odds with the other Code
articles that regulate goods. It clashes, for example, with
the rule that explicitly provides that only subsequent les-
sees can defeat the reclaiming seller.'8 Finally, it contra-
dicts what the Code drafters foresaw for reclamation;
namely, that it "constitutes preferential treatment as
against the buyer's other creditors. "19
How did this happen? This construction was lobbied for
by some venerable commercial law scholars who concluded
that certain market principles were more powerful than the
language penned by the Code's drafters. Respectfully, I
submit that this view repudiates Code language and policy,
commercial history, and basic restitution principles, not to
mention good sense.
I am not alone in taking this position. Under pressure
from secured creditor interests,20 the Article 2 Drafting
Committee,21 which is struggling to win approval of a re-
vised Article 2, has gone back and forth, unable to settle on
whether or not the floating lien creditor should triumph
over the reclaiming seller.22 The equivocation by the Com-
18 U.C.C. § 2A-503 (1990).
19 U.C.C. § 2-702, cmt. 3 (emphasis added). "Creditor" includes
"secured creditors." U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (1999).
20 "The revisers of Article 9 have consistently sought to advance the
rights of secured parties over those of unsecured parties, including the
trade creditors for whom reclamation is potentially a significant remedy,"
Larry T. Garvin, supra note 2, at 251; see generally Kenneth N. Kee,
Barbarians at The Trough: Riposte in Defense of The Warren Carve.Out
Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1466 (1997); Julian B. McDonnell, Is
Revised Article 9 a Little Greedy?, 104 CoM. L.J. 241, 264 (1999); Jean
Braucher, The UCC Gets Another Rewrite, 82 A.B.A. 66, 67 (1996);
Elizabeth Warren, Symposium: Making Policy on Imperfect Information:
The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997).
21 The first major revision to Article 2 has been in progress for over
a decade. At its May 1999 annual meeting, the American Law Institute
approved a draft, but surprisingly, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did not follow suit. Bjerre et al.,
The Uniform Commercial Code Survey: Introduction, 55 Bus. LAW. 1947
(2000).
22 In early 1996, the drafting committee voted to subordinate the
floating lienor who relies on his past advance to the article 2 reclaiming
[Vol. 2001512 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
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mittee is hardly surprising given the Balkanized way in
which Code revision occurs. 23 Because separate drafting
groups are hired to redo each of the Code articles the big
picture that the Code has in place tends to be lost. It is for
precisely that reason that the Code has been misread.
Is it unfair to allow the floating lienor, who gave up
nothing in reliance on the sold goods, to trump the unpaid
seller. The change first appeared in the Mar. 1996 draft, which gave
priority over reclaiming sellers to "good faith purchasers for new value
that arise before the Seller takes possession under a timely demand for
reclamation." May 1996 Draft 2-716 (emphasis added). In November
1996, Commissioner Ed Smith "questioned the requirement of 'new
value' [in Section 2-716(b)] and suggested that this limitation upon the
priority of after acquired security should be coordinated with the asset
based lenders in the Article 9 process." Nov. 1, 1996, Status of Article 2
Revision. Still, the "new value" requirement reappeared in several
successive drafts until March of 1997 when the drafting committee
"voted to delete the word 'new' in front of value." Drafter's Comment, §
816, May 16, 1997 Draft. Nothing appears, however, to indicate what
specific arguments the Article 9 Drafting committee made if they made
any at all. Thereafter, the floating lienor was still subordinated to the
reclaiming seller, but not by the "new value" requirement. In the March
1998 draft, it seemed clear that the reclaiming seller could lose out only
to buyers, not secured parties. The protected purchasers were, as
always, the buyer in the ordinary course and the good faith purchaser for
value to whom the goods have been delivered, which likely did not
contemplate the floating lienor relying on his past value. Mar. 1998
Draft § 2-504(b). By the December 1998 Draft, however, the reclaiming
seller lost out to the good faith purchaser whose rights vested before the
reclaiming seller took possession, which would of course protect the past,
value-giving, floating lien creditor. Dec. 1998 Draft §816(c). The
"vesting before" language remained until the November 2000 draft. That
language was dropped, but the reclaiming seller was subjected to a "good
faith purchaser," whether "under this Article" or not. Nov. 2000 Draft §
2-702(3). The most recent Article 2 draft, proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its August 2001
annual meeting, makes explicit the rights of both cash and credit sellers
to "reclaim" goods against everyone except a "buyer in the ordinary
course of business or other good faith purchaser under this Article." Aug.
2001 Draft §§ 2-507(3) and 2-702(3) [emphasis added]. This draft,
however, was also rejected.
23 After rejecting the Nov. 2000 Article 2 draft, the Article 2 and
Article 2A drafting committees were combined under a single reporter.
No. 3:509] BATTLE FOR THE BULGE
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seller? I believe that it is.24 I hope to illustrate that, as the
Code stands, only buyers, lessees and secured creditors who
rely to their detriment on the sold goods should win this
priority contest.
Part I of this article will discuss "title" holders under the
Uniform Commercial Code and the powers and rights that
they have to defeat reclaiming sellers. Part II will describe
the Code "lessees" and "secured creditors" as well as the
powers and rights that they have to defeat reclaiming sell-
ers. Part III will explain how a misreading of the Code has
subordinated the reclaiming seller of goods to the Article 9
floating lien creditor. Finally, Part IV will argue that, as
the Code drafters intended, the reclaiming seller of goods
should prevail over the floating lien creditor.
I. CODE BUYERS: PURCHASERS OF TITLE
Reclamation is an old remedy.25 The dispute erupts over
"title"26 to sold property, the 'just cause or ground of that
24 Congress rejected the Samuels result. See 7 U.S.C. § 196 (2001)
(The Packers and Stockyards Act as amended). Increasing federal
oversight over Article 9 has been noted. See Barkley Clark, Forward:
Growing Federal Presence in the Law of Secured Transactions, 42 Bus.
LAW. 1333 (1987). Colorado also amended its version of § 2-403 to protect
livestock sellers. C.R.S. §4-2-403 (Supp. 1976).
25 The common law, as does the Code today, provided such remedies
for both cash and credit sellers. See generally, Note, The Rights of
Reclaiming Cash Sellers When Contested By Secured Creditors of The
Buyer, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 934, 934-43 (1977). At common law and under
Section 73 of the Uniform Sales Act, if the cash payment failed, title to
the goods did not pass to the buyer: the seller still owned the goods.
Consequently, the buyer had no title to transfer to anyone, good faith
buyer or, a fortiori, anyone else. In a credit sale, however, title did pass,
albeit a voidable one, which could be perfected in a good faith purchaser
for value. Under the Code, the cash seller's right is derived, by
implication, from sections 2-507 and 2-511. Section 2-702 explicitly
provides for reclamation in credit sales. See generally, Arnold, supra note
17. Although the Code treats the two reclamation theories differently in
some respects, it applies its voidable title theory to both
26 "A unity combining all the requisites to complete legal
ownership." THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1967); "such a claim to
the exclusive control and enjoyment of a thing as the law will recognize
(Vol. 2001
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which is ours."27 The unpaid seller seeks to recover owner-
ship along with the goods. If the seller perfects28 his right
to reclaim, the buyer cannot stand in his way. The seller's
fight is with a resale buyer, a lessee or a secured party who
claims through his buyer.
Section 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code grants
the authority to a credit seller to reclaim his title to the
goods. His opponents are asserting various property claims
that are also regulated by the Code. At the top stands own-
ership.29 Under the Code, "title" is equivalent to "owner-
ship."3 0 If one has "title" to goods, one does not hold a
"leasehold"31 or a "security" interest
32 in them. "Leasehold"
and "security" interests are other kinds of Code property
and it is up to the title holder to create them. This is what
the Code language says in distinguishing among the vari-
ous kinds of Code property claims.33 Contrary to the pre-
vailing view, which obliterates the distinction between the
discrete Code property interests, this is what the Code
means.
Title to property forms the bedrock of our economic sys-
tem. It is so durable that, when the Code drafters rejected
and enforce." ABBOTT'S LAW DICTIONARY (1879); See also the collected
definitions in Pratt v. Fountain, 73 Ga. 261, 262 (1884).
27 As translated from the Latin by the Court in Pratt, 73 Ga. at 262.
28 In credit sales, "upon demand made within ten days after receipt"
of the goods. U.C.C. § 2-702. There is no time limit if a
"misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery." Id. In cash reclamation, no
time limit applies to the demand. U.C.C. § 2-507 cmt. 3 (1989).
29 "Ownership of property consists of a bundle of separate rights,
powers and privileges." Cool Homes v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 860
P.2d 1248, 1254 (A.X, 1993), citing W. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 9, at 13-14 (3d ed. 1965).
'0 U.C.C. § 2-106 (1989). "A sale transfers ownership and possession
of the article for a price." Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Service, 212 A.2d 769, 776 (N.J. 1965).
3, U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(m) (1999).
32 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1999).
3 U.C.C. § 2-722 (1989), for example, explicitly distinguishes
between holders of "title" and "security interests" in determining who has
standing to sue for injury to goods.
No. 3:509] BATTLE FOR THE BULGE
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title analysis as a working tool,34 they neglected to excise it
from the Code framework. 35 Thus, "where the [Code] provi-
sion refers to ... title,"36 title analysis still governs how the
Code assigns consequences to the personal property it regu-
lates. 37 What the drafters said about title principles, and
what they did with them, have created the double bind that
has confounded the foes of the reclaiming seller.
As the Code views it, a person owns property when he
has most of the rights and privileges to it.38 That much
seems settled. As legions of commentators have observed,
however, "ownership" is far easier to define than to de-
scribe.39
Under the Code, a "buyer"40 takes "title." A buyer is a
Code "purchaser."4 1 So are "lessees,"42 "secured parties" 43
3 U.C.C. § 2-401 (1989) (preamble). "This Article deals with the
issues between seller and buyer in terms of step by step performance or
non-performance under the contract for sale and not in terms of whether
or not 'title' to the goods has passed." Id., cmt. 1.
31 See Evergreen Marine, Corp. v. Six Consignments of Frozen
Scallops, 4 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 1993); Michael G. Bridge et al.,
Formalism, Functionalism, and Understanding The Law of Secured
Transactions, 44 MCGiLL L. J. 567, 574-75 (1999); Margit Livingston,
Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in Collateral Under Article 9 of
The Uniform Commercial Code, 73 N.C. L. REV. 115 (1994); William L.
Tabac, The Unbearable Lightness of Title Under The Uniform
Commercial Code, 50 MD. L. REV. 408, 408-09 (1991). Commenting on
good faith purchase analysis under the Code, one writer has said, "[Ilt is
indicative of how difficult it is to eliminate the title concept from lawyers'
thinking." Graeme S. Cooper, The Reclamation Rights of Unpaid and
Unsecured Sellers in International Trade 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 17,
72 (1987).
36 § 2-401 (preamble).
37 Id.
38 E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 174 S.E.2d 511, 519
(N.C. 1970); see United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1961)
(entire bundle of rights passes with title).
39 "The attempt to establish ... who ha[s] the title ... often can
involve intricate, obscure and frustratingly puzzling title questions."
LAWRENCE VOLD, LAW OF SALES 7 (2d ed. 1959).
40 See § 2-103(1)(a) (1999); § 2-106 (1989).
41 U.C.C. § 1-201(33) (1977). A "purchaser" takes by "any voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property." § 1-201(32).
42 § 2A-103(1)(n).
[Vol. 2001
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and anyone else to whom a Code property interest is trans-
ferred voluntarily by the property's owner.4 The definition
of "purchase" is therefore broad. At the apex is the buyer
who purchases all or most of the bundle of rights that con-
stitute ownership. A "leasee" purchases possession and
use.45 The Article 9 "secured party 46 purchases a lien on
property to enforce an obligation.47
The Code is organized into eight substantive articles.
Article 2 covers transfers of title to goods.48 Article 2A gov-
erns leasehold interests in goods.49 One article regulates
goods indirectly. Article 7, which governs documents of ti-
tle,50 establishes rules for negotiable paper l that control
ownership of goods. Articles 3 and 8 govern other Code
property. These articles deal generally with quasi-
intangible property, including "instruments"52 and "securi-
ties. '53 Article 9 regulates "security interests"54 in all Code
property, tangible and intangible.
55
43 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(72) (2000).
44 U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1977).
45 § 2A-103(1)(n).
46 § 9-102(72) (2000). Holders of security interests that arise by
operation of law are not Code "purchasers." See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-711(3)
(1989).
47 So says the general definition of security interest in § 1-201(37).
For policy reasons, to force recording of claims, the term will also include
consignors and certain buyers of intangible property. Id. at (c) and (d).
48 Technically, the article applies to "transactions in goods." § 2-
102. But the article's key provisions deal with "sales," e.g., §§ 2-313, 2-
314, 2-315, which is the transfer of title for a price. § 2-106. The broader
scope presumably refers to transactional issues that arise before and
after title is transferred. Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Pease 829
S.W.2d 489, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (Article 2 deals only with sales).
49 Before Article 2A was created, some courts extended Article 2 to
leases by analogy, particularly its warranty provisions. See, e.g.,
Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter. Inc.,
396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
50 § 1-201(15).
61 U.C.C. § 7-501 (1991) et seq.
52 U.C.C. § 3-104 (1991).
53 U.C.C. § 8-102(15) (1991).
54 § 1-201(37).
55 U.C.C. § 9-110 (2000) provides that security interests arising
under other Code articles are "subject to" Article 9.
No. 3:509]
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All of these articles recognize title as the ultimate prop-
erty claim and provide rules to govern its transfer. Each of
these articles provides rules to resolve competing title
claims. Because of the different natures of Code property,
title rights to it differ, as does the way that title can be
taken away.
It has long been a maxim of American law that a thief
cannot create ownership rights in goods.56 The owner of
goods must voluntarily part with his control over goods be-
fore he can lose title to them.57 The owner must "introduce
[them]... into the stream of commerce."58 The rule is part of
the framework of Article 2.59 It is also a part of Articles 2A60
and 7,61 which also cover goods, but not of Articles 3, 8 and
9. The maxim has been put to its test by the Revisionist
reading of the Code.
Before title to goods can be transferred under Article 2,
the owner must deliver 62 the goods to another person.63
56 Nixon v. Brown, 57 N.H. 34, 37 (1876). "The possessor of stolen
goods does not have voidable title and therefore cannot convey good title
under Section 2-403 regardless of how innocently the goods have been
acquired by him." Suburban Motors, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 218 Cal. App.3d 1354, 1361 (Ct. App. 1990), citing, ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403:26, 584 (3d ed. 1983). The rule is
different in civil law countries where a thief can create new ownership.
See Ian M. Goldrich, Comment, Balancing The Need, 23 FORD. INT'L L. J.
118, 141 (1998). The UNIDROIT Convention attempts to strike a balance
between common law jurisdictions. Id.
57 E.g., Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829,
840 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
58 LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 184 (2nd ed.
1959).
59 E.g., Morgold, Inc. v. Keeler, 891 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (art is subject to the "usual rule").
60 Cucchi v. Rollins Protective Services Co., 574 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa.
1990) (recognizes derivative nature of Article 2A).
61 See § 7-503 (1999) (owner must either deliver or entrust goods to
lose ownership). This was also the common law rule. E.g., Soltau v.
Gerdau, 23 N.E. 864, 866 (N.Y. 1890).
62 Unless otherwise agreed. § 2-308 (1989). The transfer must be
voluntary. Hawkland, UCC SERIES, 2-403:04.
63 LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW OF SALES, supra note 58,
at 184.
[Vol. 2001
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Delivery is the first step in creating either a right 64 or a
power 65 to transfer title to goods to someone else. Under
Articles 366 and 8,67 with their sweeping negotiability poli-
cies, ownership of intangible property can be transferred
even though the owner never delivered it. A finder or even
a thief may create ownership of notes, drafts or investment
securities. 68
A. Rights and Powers to Transfer Title Under Articles 2
and 2A
Under the Code, a person who has unavoidable 69 title to
goods exercises the right to create good title in someone else
by delivering the goods to that person with the intention of
transferring title to him.70 But if the owner delivers goods
without such an intention, the recipient may nevertheless
acquire a power to transfer title to them,7 1 but only to Arti-
cle 2 "buyers"72 who purchase for "value"73 and in "good
faith."74 In these cases, the title-taking buyer will be per-
mitted to rely on an "apparent title"7 5 that the Code con-
64 A legally enforceable claim of one person against another that the
other shall do a given act or shall not do a given act. RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 1 (1936).
65 The "ability on the part of a person to produce a change in a
given legal relation by doing or not doing a given act." Id.; see Wesley N.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16, 30 (1913-14).
66 See §§ 3-301 and 3-302 (1991).
67 See §§ 8-302 and 8-303 (1994).
68 E.g., Fidelity Trust v. Mays, 83 S.E. 961 (Ga. 1914).
69 Oliver v. Platt, 44 U.S. 333, 405 (1845) (beyond all legal
exception).
70 A Van Drimmelin v. Converse, 181 N.W. 699, 700 (Iowa 1921).
71 § 2-403. Even if the goods are acquired under false pretenses.
Perimeter Ford, Inc. v. Edwards, 399 S.E.2d 520, 523 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990).
72 § 1-201(9).
73 § 1-201(44).
74 §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(B).
75 "Has the mere holder of... property such ostensible ownership
that third persons may deal safely with him on the strength of his
apparent title?" Shephard v. VanDoren, 60 P.2d 635, 645 (N.M. 1931).
Apparent title is similar to "color of title." Brooks v. Bruyn, 35 Ill. 392,
No. 3:509]
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structs to protect him when he innocently parts with the
price. Apparent ownership begins under Article 2 with de-
livery by the seller to a buyer or by merely "entrusting"7
6
the goods to a merchant 77 who deals in goods of that kind.
7 8
Apparent title to goods is an appearance of ownership that
the Code holds to be sufficient to create binding ownership
expectations in an Article 2 buyer.79 It must begin, however,
with some form of consent by the true owner. Possession of
goods alone is not enough to create ownership expecta-
tions.80
Whatever limitations exist on Article 2 reclamation are
imposed by Article 2, specifically, subsection (3) of Section
2-702. Only two kinds of "purchasers" can defeat the re-
claiming seller under Article 2 as it is written. One is the
buyer in the ordinary course of business.8' The other is a
good faith purchaser who takes title for value. 82 Both are
Article 2 "buyers" who must rely on their seller's apparent
ownership by giving fresh value and taking delivery. 83
This is the Article 2 negotiability policy. It protects buy-
ers who rely on the apparent ownership of goods that Arti-
cle 2 constructs. The Article 2A policy, which protects les-
sees who rely on the apparent ownership of their lessors, is
identical. 8
4
394 (1864). By his conduct, the true owner "authorizes or ratifies the
sale, or is precluded... from denying the third party's authority to make
it." Wilson v. Commercial Fin. Co., 79 S.E.2d 908, 913 (N.C. 1954).
76 § 2-403(3).
7 U.C.C. § 2-104(1978).
78 § 2-403(2).
79 Ogunsanya Duros INMI-ETTI v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1985).
80 Soltau, 23 N.E. at 864.
81 § 1-201(9).
82 E.g., Eaton & Co. v. Davidson, 21 N.E. 442, 443 (Ohio 1889). The
Uniform Sales Act sections upon which 2-403 is in part based referred
more explicitly to such purchasers as "buyers" taking "title" to goods. See
UNiFORM SALEs ACT §§23 and 24.
83 See Pacific Wool Growers v. Draper & Co., Inc., 73 P.2d 1391,
1394 (Or. 1937). § 2-403 is based, in part, on Section 25 of the Uniform
Sales Act which protects subsequent purchasers that "receiv[e] and pay...
value" for goods previously sold but still in the seller's possession.
84 See § 2A-304.
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B. Power to Sell Under Articles 3 and 8
To serve far greater negotiability policies, Articles 3 and
8 lay out much broader apparent ownership principles.
Under these articles, apparent ownership of property,
which carries with it the power to create good title to prop-
erty, can arise in a finder8 5 or even a thief.86 If a person
takes lost or stolen Article 387 or 888 paper, he may be able
to cut off prior ownership claims to this kind of Code prop-
erty in the same way that a person who acquires money can
cut off such claims. 89 Whether or not the owner consents or
participates in the transfer of title is irrelevant.
The protected purchaser must first take "hold"90 or con-
trol91 of such paper. A "holder"92 is someone who is in pos-
session of Code paper that carries enforceable "rights."93
Someone "controls" Code paper when he has the exclusive
right to enforce it.94 What distinguishes these purchasers of
Code paper from a person who takes possession of goods is
the expectation created by the nature of the property. If
genuine, Code paper, like currency, carries enforceable
rights within its four corners.95 Goods may or may not carry
such rights.96 That will depend upon whether they were
lost, stolen or otherwise purloined from their rightful owner
because rights to goods require that their owner at least
85 Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879).
86 Id.
87 See § 3-104.
88 See § 8-102(4); Alexander v. Homer, 1 F. Cas. 366 (E.D. Ark.
1879).
89 Stone Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 199 F.2d 127,
131 (6th Cir. 1952).
90 § 3-301
91 § 8-303
92 § 3-301
93 § 3-301
94 See U.C.C. § 8-106 (1994).
95 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Weir, 247 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952), modified in 251 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1952).
96 The same for documents of title regulated by Article 7. Although
documents may be negotiable like their Article 3 and 8 counterparts,
they cannot create ownership in goods that were stolen. See U.C.C. § 7-
503 (1999); Velsian v. Lewis, 16 P. 631, 633 (Or. 1888).
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deliver them into the stream of commerce. 97 By contrast,
rights to Code paper arise when the creator of the paper, by
authenticating it,98 grants such rights to whomever holds 99
or controls the paper. 100 Unlike goods, the fact that Code
paper (or money) was lost or stolen has no bearing on the
validity of those rights. Even a thief or a finder of Code pa-
per can enforce it. By creating the rights that Code paper
contains, the obligor has in fact consented to bind himself to
whomever comes into possession of the paper, including the
finder or thief.101 Mere possession of goods does not neces-
sarily carry such consent. This is what makes Code paper
so much more negotiable than goods.
But the thief or finder cannot enforce Code paper
against its rightful owner. 102 Only an innocent purchaser of
the paper can cut off ownership claims. If the holder or one
who controls Code paper takes it in "good faith,"' 03 he will
not know that the paper was lost or stolen. If, in addition,
he paid for the paper, his expectation will be comparable to
that possessed by the good faith purchaser of money. This
kind of taker of Code paper reasonably believes that the
enforceable rights that are contained in the instrument are
his to enforce. This is the apparent ownership policy of the
Code articles that regulate commercial paper.
Apparent ownership, and with it, the power to cut off
ownership claims, therefore arises more easily with Code
intangibles than it does with goods.
Why should different market forces rule goods and Code
paper? It has to do both with the kind of property they are
and the kind of expectations they create in people who
97 Pacific Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Italy, 209 P. 1024, 1027 (Cal
Ct. App. 1922) (owner can only be divested of title by his own act).
98 § 1-201(39) (signature); § 3-401 (no liability on instrument unless
signed).
99 § 3-104 (payable to "order" or "bearer").
100 See §§ 8-202 and 8-204 (1994) (restrictions on transfer generally
ineffective).
101 Shaw, supra note 85, at 564.
102 E.g., Queenan v. Mays, 90 F.2d 525, 531 (10th Cir. 1937).
103 § 3-302 (holder in due course); § 8-303 (without notice of adverse
claim).
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would purchase them. Goods have a limited negotiability
compared with Code paper because of what still survives of
the doctrine of caveat emptor. 10 4 The rule that a finder or a
thief cannot create ownership of goods is so fundamental,
and understood, that a buyer of goods or of the title docu-
ment that serves as their proxy, knows that he will have to
give the goods up if they are stolen.10 5 Secured lenders who
advance funds against goods know that too, which is why
they routinely check the debtor's source of title.106 But the
purchaser of Code paper validly held 0 7 or controlled by him
expects to be able to enforce the rights that appear in it
unless he knows that someone else is asserting an owner-
ship claim to it.108
II. MUCH LESS THAN TITLE: CODE LESSEES AND
SECURED PARTIES
Along with "buyers," the Code recognizes other kinds of
"purchasers." "Lessees" and "secured creditors" also pur-
chase property rights.
A "lessee" purchases possession and use of goods. 10 9 Arti-
cle 2A, which governs leases, recognizes two kinds of leases.
One, the "finance" lease," 0 is negotiated before the lessor
104 "It is the buyer's own fault if he is so negligent as not to ascertain
the right of the vendor to sell, and he cannot successfully invoke his bona
fides to protect himself from liability to the true owner...." Velsian v.
Lewis, 16 P. 631, 633 (Or. 1888).
105 "This is a moral issue." Lord Jannor of the Holocaust Educational
Trust, as reported by Godfrey Barker, Don't Let Us Act Like Nazis Over
This, TmEs (London), Mar. 2, 2000, at 23.
106 See Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Vessel Maden Chapel, 821 F. Supp.
1361, 1365 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Craig R. Thorstenson, Mortgage Lender
Liability To The Purchaser of New or Existing Homes, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 191 (1988).
107 Defined in § 1-201(20).
108 "In the hands of the holder, it is evidence of ownership. Its
transfer.. .precludes all inquiry into the transaction in which it
originated, because it has come into the hands of persons who have
innocently paid value for it." Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U.S. 7, 8 (1881).
109 § 2A-103(l)(b).
110 § 2A-103(1)(g).
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acquires title to the good to be leased. The other, called a
"subsequent" lease,"' is formed after the lessor has ac-
quired ownership of the leased good. Under the finance
lease, the buyer of the good takes title to it "in connection
with" a prearranged lease with his lessee.112 The buyer-
lessor's role is to put up the purchase money that will en-
able the lessee to acquire his rights of possession and use.113
The buyer-lessor therefore acts as a conduit. Whatever
vulnerabilities of ownership he has pass through him to the
lessee from the instant that title is transferred to him.11
4
Constructed from Article 2, Article 2A recognizes that a
lessor with voidable title 1"5to the good can create a good
lease in only one class of lessee, namely, the "subsequent"
lessee.116  This lessee, as opposed to the "finance" lessee,
parts with monies worth in reliance on the lessor's apparent
ownership of the leased good. The finance lessee therefore
stands in the shoes of his lessor, who must yield his defec-
tive ownership to the reclaiming seller. The subsequent
lessee, like Article 2 buyers who part with value in reliance
on the apparent ownership of his transferor, prevails over
the reclaiming seller.117
A "security interest" is much less than "ownership" or
even "possession" and "use" for that matter. A security in-
terest can be created either by agreement"18 or can arise by
operation of law.119 It is a lien that attaches to property
111 See § 2A-304.
112 § 2A-103(1)(g).
113 The finance lease may be "created to facilitate acquisition of
expensive equipment and to protect lenders against risks associated with
such acquisitions. ... Telecom Int'l Am. Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 187 F.R.D.
492, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
114 See § 2A-304.
115 Id.
116 "[A] lessor with voidable title has power to transfer a good
leasehold interest to a good faith subsequent lessee for value." [emphasis
added]. § 2A-304 cmt. 5 (pointing out that it is meant to state a "unified
policy on good faith purchase of goods.").
117 § 2A-304.
118 § 9-102(73).
119 E.g., § 2-711(3).
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rights.1 20 It may therefore attach to "title," "possession,"
"use" or all of these rights at once. The secured party does
not acquire title to the goods or their use as the case may
be.12' Rather, he thrives off of his debtor's title to or lesser
rights to exploit the collateral.1
22
The lien of a secured creditor is therefore wholly deriva-
tive; it depends upon whether and to what extent his debtor
can assert "rights" to Code property. 23 If a secured creditor
attempts to attach his claim to property in which his debtor
cannot assert rights, he, like his debtor, is subject to being
ousted by someone who can.
Thus, in a reclamation contest between a secured credi-
tor and a seller of goods, the questions will be, does the
buyer-debtor have "rights" to the property to which a secu-
rity interest can attach, and, if he does, may those rights be
asserted against a reclaiming seller?
The Code clearly recognizes that, like a buyer with void-
able title, a debtor without rights to Code property may
have a power to create rights to which a security interest
may attach. That power is authorized by Article 9, not Ar-
ticle 2. It arises in two cases. First, a consignee with mere
possessory rights to goods may have the power to attach a
security interest to the consignor's ownership rights.124 Sec-
ond, a seller who has sold certain intangibles may have the
power to sell them again.
25
120 Williams v. Westinghouse, 468 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ark. 1971).
121 E.g., Frierson v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1272,
1275 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (absent default).
122 Estate of Harris v. Harris, 218 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2000)
(no ownership of cattle, no security interest in them); Northwestern Bank
v. First Virginia Bank of Damascus, 585 F. Supp. 425, 429 (W.D. Va.
1984) (some ownership interest). At the least, something beyond "naked
possession" is required. Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture, Inc., 564
P.2d 210, 214 (Or. 1977).
123 In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 665 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1981) (no
rights, no security interest).
124 U.C.C. § 9-319(a) (2000).
125 U.C.C. § 9-318(b) (2000) (accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangibles and promissory notes). The transfer of title of such property
is covered by Article 9. See §9-109.
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The debtor's power to create these rights springs from
his apparent ownership. As elsewhere in the Code, this
apparent ownership and with it, the power to encumber or
sell property that one does not own is destroyed once third
parties have reason to know that it does not exist. It is,
therefore, destroyed when perfection occurs for once the
consignor or intangibles buyer publishes his claim, third
parties cannot be misled.126
The Uniform Commercial Code, as written and enacted,
allows relying "buyers" of goods and "lessees" to be pro-
tected from reclaiming sellers. It may even allow, although
it does not expressly provide, relying secured creditors to
prevail over reclaiming sellers. But what it does not do is
permit secured creditors who do not rely on the sold goods
to triumph over reclaiming sellers.
III. How THE CODE HAS BEEN MISREAD
Given the plain meaning of the Code language, how did
the floating lien creditor come to occupy his favored posi-
tion? It had nothing to do with any superior equity he
might have against the reclaiming seller. An existing credi-
tor's claim to sold goods for which his debtor has not paid is
not, in itself, a superior equity. It was through the advo-
cacy of a few prominent commentators who believed that
market principles were much more important than property
rights.
These commentators pressed for a negotiability of goods
that rivaled that of commercial paper. Among them were
Samuel Williston, who drafted the Uniform Sales Act,12 7
and Lawrence Vold, who published a respected treatise on
sales. 128 The policy to be served was security in commercial
transactions. If unrelying secured creditors are permitted
126 § 9-318(b) (accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and
promissory notes), and § 9-319(b) (consignments).
127 See SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GoODs AT
COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFoRM SALES ACT (1909).
128 LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES §79 (2d ed.
1959).
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to triumph over reclaiming sellers, they contended, com-
merce will be conducted more efficiently and more expecta-
tions will be fulfilled, which will serve the greater good.
129
To make their case for the floating lien creditor, they
stopped just short of theft, and began with the settled one:
the innocent buyer from a seller with voidable title. If left
undisturbed, they pointed out that the defective exchange
generates further commitments from still more buyers and
other kinds of purchasers. Multiplied expectations are, af-
ter all, no more than the desired consequences of classical
consideration, which justifies enforcement of bargained-for
exchanges. 130 One of these enhanced expectations, they
contended, may be held by the floating lien creditor. Unlike
the resale buyer, he does not give new value in reliance on
the sold good, but he may contribute something just as
valuable to the market. By learning that the debtor has
acquired the goods, but not knowing of their seller's right to
reclaim them, the floating lien creditor might forego fore-
closing on his debtor and thus keep him in business.131 For
129 "Suppose goods are taken by a creditor merely as security for a
preexisting debt without giving any binding extension of time. Here the
weight of common-law authority in this country regarded the transfer as
not a transfer for value . . . . [But this] does not produce socially
advantageous results. Though forbearance is not expressly bargained
for, the effect of conveying goods as security is almost inevitably that 'it
stays the handoff the creditor' [citing Leask v. Scott, 2 Q.B.D. 376
(1877)]. It causes the creditor to forbear or to relax his efforts to make
present collection. Thereby in fact this line of credit is maintained a
while longer on the strength of the new security. Without the new
security it would have been closed out . . . . That position is to be
preferred which both makes possible the extended continuance of
productive credit and promotes security of transactions." Id. at 404.
130 See Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The Promissory Basis of Past
Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1985); Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1432, 1434
(1985).
131 "[The secured creditor's] subsequent conduct is almost sure to be
affected by possession of the security. Even though forbearance is not
bargained for, the effect almost inevitably is to cause the creditor to
forbear or to diminish his efforts to obtain satisfaction from other
sources." SAMUEL WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAw 1038
(1909)
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that reason, they asserted, the floating lienor should prevail
over the reclaiming seller.
132
The courts, however, were less introspective. The Revi-
sionist position was adopted by them through a misreading
of the Code language rather than by sorting out the inter-
dependent property interests within their Code barriers. 133
Leading the cases 34 that hold that the floating lien creditor
132 Referring to past value, Williston wrote, "[There] seems to be no
reason to distinguish when negotiable paper is purchased and where
property of other sorts is purchased. Chattels transferred by negotiable
paper should [therefore] be treated the same." Id. The Code, however,
does not go this far either. Under Article 7, no matter how negotiable the
document, an owner who does not cause the goods to be bailed cannot
lose his title to them See § 7-503 ("Document of Title to Goods Defeated
in Certain Cases").
133 "The Code is an integrated statute whose Articles and Sections
overlap and flow into one another." In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238,
1241 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom; see generally
Stowers v. Mahon, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
134 The 3rd, 5th, 8th, 9th and 10th circuit courts of appeal have
concluded that a floating lienor takes priority over the reclaiming seller.
Toyota Indus. Trucks USA v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 611 F.2d 465, 473 (3rd
Cir. 1979); Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1241; In re Pester Refining Co., 964 F.2d
842, 846 (8th Cir. 1992); Los Angeles Paper Bag Co. v. Talcott, 604 F.2d
38 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wyo. Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068
(10th Cir. 1974). Several state supreme courts have also favored the
floating lien creditor. Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colo. Springs Nat'l Bank,
519 P.2d 354, 359 (Colo. 1974); Iola State Bank v. Bolan, 679 P.2d 720
(Kan. 1984); Maryott v. Oconto Cattle Co., 607 N.W.2d 820, 827 (Neb.
2000); O'Brien v. Chandler, 765 P.2d 1165, 1166 (N.M. 1988); Evans
Products Co.'v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978, 981 (Or. 1966); Cont. Grain Co.
v. Heritage Bank, 548 N.W.2d 507, 513 (S.D. 1996); House of Stainless,
Inc. v. Marshal and flsley Bank, 249 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis. 1977) as
have a few state Courts of Appeal. E.g., B&P Lumber Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 250 S.E.2d 505, 507 (Ga. App. 1978); Peerless Equipment Co v.
Azle State Bank, 559 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. App. 1977).
Some courts prefer the reclaiming seller. The Third Circuit has
concluded that the secured creditor cannot rely on past value to win over
the reclaiming seller. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (1960). Although the
Seventh Circuit has criticized Samuels, it is "a question we have
avoided." In Re Reliable Drug Stores, 70 F.3d 948, 950 (1995). In
Citizens Bank of Roseville v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 325 (1983),
in holding for the reclaiming seller, a State Appeals Court concluded
that, "Bank, unlike the typical good faith purchaser for value, did not
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takes prior to the Article 2 reclaiming seller is In re
Samuels & Co,135 where the Fifth Circuit concluded that a
floating lien creditor, who acts in good faith,136 takes free of
the seller's right to reclaim, even if the creditor did not rely
on the sold goods. 37 The result is fair, the court reasoned,
because the reclaiming seller can always protect itself by
entering into a secured transaction with his buyer 138 and
achieve the superpriority 39 that Article 9 gives to the pur-
chase money lender.
The statutory path to the Fifth Circuit's holding pro-
ceeded as follows: a reclaiming seller, under Article 2, must
rely on either cash'40 or credit' 41 theories of reclamation.
These Article 2 theories provide that the buyer has title to
the goods, but that it is voidable, and that the seller can
rescind the transaction and recover it.142
give value for the automobile, nor did Bank in making the loans, rely on
the ostensible ownership or voidable title of [its seller]."
135 Samuels was the subject of considerable litigation. See No. BK 3-
1314 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (findings of fact of Bankruptcy Ref. Whitehurst),
rev'd No. 73-1185 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd and remanded, 483 F.2d 557 (5th
Cir. 1973), rev'd and remanded sub nom; Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100
(1974) (per curiam), rev'd sub nom. In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139
(5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on reh'g, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
cert den. sub nom; Stowers v. Mahon, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
136 Good faith, the court reasoned, did not prevent C.I.T. from
cutting off its debtor's funds--pulling the plug on a sinking ship--even
though it might trigger reclamation remedies. Samuels, 526 F.2d at
1244.
137 Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1238.
138 Id. at 1248 (concurring opinion of Judge Gee); See U.C.C. § 9-107
(2000).
139 U.C.C. § 9-324 (2000).
140 This contention is derived from section 2-507 and section 2-511.
Reclamation is "implicit in... § 2-507(2)." Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc.,
630 F.2d 1 (1st. Cir. 1979).
141 U.C.C. § 2-702 (2000).
142 An issue that split the three-judge panel was whether the sales
were cash or credit transactions. Under cash sale reclamation, the buyer
has no "right" to the goods as against the seller. No such language is
found in section 2-702. Thus, cash reclamation was the stronger case for
the ranchers. The problem was that the ranchers could not be paid until
their cattle was graded, and it took a short time to perform that function.
The en banc court agreed with the three judge panel that these were cash
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Both Article 2 sellers are therefore subject, the court
recognized,143 to the claims of certain good faith purchasers.
But the protected purchasers must find their shelter under
Article 2, specifically Section 2-403, not under Article 9.
The Code so provides by explicit language, 1' and the court
agreed.145 Upon reaching Section 2-403, however, the court
lost its way. The Fifth Circuit concluded that, as a good
faith purchaser for value under the Code, 146 an Article 9
floating lien creditor can take priority over the reclaiming
seller.
An examination of Section 2-403 shows, however, that it
does not apply to secured creditors. 147 With "title" as its
centerpiece, Section 2-403 controls Article 2 ownership
rights, not "leasehold" or "security" interests. 14 Conse-
quently, the Section applies only to "sales," the subject of
the article in which it is found. What Section 2-403 does is
empower a buyer with voidable title149 to create good title'50
in an innocent, value-giving buyer. The protected Section
2-403 "purchaser" will therefore take "title" to the goods,
not a "leasehold interest"' 51 or a "security interest"'52 in
sales because payment, made as soon as practicable, was intended to be
made contemporaneously with delivery. Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1238.
143 Id. at 1242.
144 "The seller's right to reclaim ... is subject to the rights of a buyer
in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article
(Section 2-403)." § 2-702(3) (emphasis added).
145 "C.I.T.'s status [was] as an Article 2 good faith purchaser..."
Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1243.
146 Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1254.
147 "The rights of other purchasers of goods are ... governed by the
Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9) ... and Documents of Title
(Article 7)." § 2-403(4).
148 If a security interest arises under Article 2, the Code directs that
Article 9 governs it, not Article 2. U.C.C. § 9-110 (2000).
149 "A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title." §
2-403(1).
150 "The Uniform Commercial Code is written so that definitions
appearing in any particular Article usually apply only to transactions
governed by that Article." Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645
F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1981).
151 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(m) (2000).
152 U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2000).
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them. These interests are created and governed, respec-
tively, by Articles 2A and 9. In fact, Section 2-403 expressly
diverts secured creditors to Article 9 to determine what
rights they might have as purchasers from a buyer with
voidable title.153
As I have used "title" interchangeably with "ownership,"
the Revisionists have used "security interest" inter-
changeably with "title."'154 In so doing, they have destroyed
the boundary between Articles 2 and 9. As seen through
the kaleidoscope employed by the Fifth Circuit, "the Code is
an integrated statute whose Articles and Sections overlap
and flow into one another."'155  Under Section 2-403, as
drafted, however, it is clear that the only good faith pur-
chasers who can defeat the reclaiming seller are both buy-
ers.156 One is the buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness,157 the other is a buyer in a resale from a buyer with
voidable title.158 The concept, hence, the boundary between
a "sale" and a "secured transaction" governed respectively
by Articles 2 and 9 of the Code, is indisputable.
Following the Fifth Circuit lead, most courts have read
"title" out of Section 2-403.159 Given the Code drafters' de-
termined efforts to shun "title" as a working concept, this is
hardly surprising.
153 U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (2000).
154 See § 2-401 (preamble).
155 Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1241.
156 Referring to its subsection (1), U.C.C. 2-403, cmt. 1 says that "the
provisions of the section are applicable to a person taking by any form of
'purchase' as defined by this Act." Relying on the "official" comments to
interpret Code sections is generally not approved. E.g., Simmons v.
Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979). In any event, when the
comment was appended to the section, the section required that its good
faith purchasers take delivery of the goods, which, of course, would rule
out the floating lien creditor but not all secured creditors. See Julian B.
McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. LAW
REV. 429, 450-51 (1977).
167 § 1-201(9).
158 McDonnell, supra note 156, at 451 (section 2-403's drafting
history "shows little evidence of intent" to protect floating lienor).
159 In holding for a floating lien creditor over a reclaiming seller, one
court did not even bother to read Section 2-403. Evans Products Co. v.
Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978 (Or. 1966).
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The Code, though, is open to supplementation by certain
principles of "law and equity."'160 Like virtually every other
Code rule, Section 2-403 is not an exclusive statement of
the governing principles, but rather a window that will ad-
mit still other consistent principles of governing law. Con-
sequently, if such external principles can be found, it really
does not matter what the Code says, so long as what is in
fact written is not contradicted by them.161 There are, how-
ever, no common law or equitable principles that favor the
floating creditor over the reclaiming seller who has not re-
lied on the sold goods.
Two possible sources of such a rule would be the com-
mon law and the law of restitution. In both cases, the
creditor must commit by changing his position in reliance
on the sold goods. Under the common law, the prevailing
view162 was that the unreliant creditor was subordinated to
the reclaiming seller. Only secured creditors who made
advances against the sold goods without being aware of the
seller's claim would not lose their liens if the goods were
reclaimed. A reclaiming seller could reestablish his owner-
ship claim, but it was encumbered by the lien that had at-
tached to it.163 Thus, the floating lien creditor can take no
comfort in the common law. 64 Indeed, one modern court,
citing Section 1-103, applied the common law rule to favor a
reclaiming cash seller over a floating lien creditor. 165
Restitution principles, the second possible source to fa-
vor the floating lien creditor, are aimed at unjust enrich-
160 U.C.C. § 1-103; Citizens State Bank v. Peoples Bank, 475 N.E.2d
324, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (promissory estoppel "consistent" with good
faith defined in 1-203).
161 Bay Springs Forest Products, Inc. v. Wade, 435 So. 2d 690, 694
n.1 (Miss. 1983) (§ 2-403 "displaces" common law but does not "change"
it).
162 E.g., Citizens Bank of Roseville v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318,
325 (1983); Hawkins v. M & J Finance Corp., 77 S.E.2d 669 (N.C. 1953).
16 E.g., Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901).
164 Summarizing the common law rule, Williston said, "One who
takes chattels as collateral for an antecedent debt is not a purchaser for
value." WILLISToN, THE LAw GOVERNING SALES, supra note 127, at 1038.
165 In re Emery Corp., 38 B.R. 489, 491 (1984).
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ment.166  They, too, protect persons who rely by lending
against the sold goods. The enriched party must account to
the relying party for any benefit the relying party conferred
upon him.1 67 The buyer from the reclaiming seller has not
enriched anyone. If anything, the reclaiming seller has en-
riched him and, under the current view, his floating lien
creditor.1 68 The common law embraced these principles.
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code left them
intact.169
There are many problems with the Revisionist view. To
begin with, the Code simply does not support the position
that goods are, or should be, as negotiable as its paper. It is
beyond dispute that a finder or thief cannot effectively sell
goods. To negotiate goods, a person must either own them
by having at least a voidable title to them or their owner
must entrust 170 the goods to a person dealing in goods of
166 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937); "Unjust enrichment
occurs when a person fails to make restitution of property or benefits
when he or she has an obligation to do so." Ivey v. Williams, 328 S.E.2d
837, 839-40 (N.C. App. 1985).
167 Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir. 1994) (not only
money or property); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Couch, 376 S.E.2d 104, 109
(W. Va. 1988) (a benefit "saves an expense or loss").
168 "The seller has certainly not extracted assets from the business
to satisfy some antecedent debt. Instead, new and valuable assets are
contributed and, unlike a lender, the unpaid seller contributes the full
value of the contributed goods--a lender will typically advance only a
portion of the value of the goods." Graeme S. Cooper, The Reclamation
Rights of Unpaid and Unsecured Sellers in International Trade, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 17, 26 (1987).
169 One commentator has argued that Section 1-103 contains an
equitable rule that favors the reclaiming seller. Under the "antiwindfall"
principle, which is restitutionary in nature, the undeserving floating lien
creditor's gain would be both unearned and at the seller's expense. Clyde
Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of The
Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 906, 921 (1978). The
argument has been used to justify the superpriority that Article 9 awards
to purchase money secured parties. Robert M. Lloyd, Refinancing
Purchase Money Security Interests, 53 TENN. L. REV. 1, 58 (1985).
170 U.C.C. § 2-403(3); Orlando Dodge v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 661
So. 2d 322, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (knowing acquiescence in
placement of good with dealer).
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that kind. 17 ' Not so under Articles 3 and 8 where good faith
purchasers can cut off ownership claims to lost or stolen
paper merely by taking hold of it.
The functions of goods and negotiable paper, which the
Revisionists would have goods mimic, also differentiate
them. The efficacy of paper as an exchange medium would
fail if purchasers were required to investigate sources be-
fore buying it. Because of its anti-theft policy, Article 2 is
not designed to move the goods it covers with the speed of
Code paper. When merchants buy, they must adhere to
trade standards of fair dealing. 172 Banks routinely investi-
gate the chain of title of collateral that they seek to encum-
ber.173 The breach of the boundary between Articles 2 and 9
has turned Code notice policy upside down. Article 2, upon
which the Revisionists must rely to give a defaulting buyer
the power to create rights in secured creditors, contains no
publication requirement. Nothing in Section 2-403 requires
its "purchasers" to give record notice of their claim to the
bought goods, for good reason. Buyers of goods do not give
such notice; to require them to do so would undermine Arti-
cle 2 negotiability. Under the prevailing view, the floating
lienor need not even give notice to win.17 Under the Revi-
sionist rule, unperfected secured creditors prevail over re-
claiming sellers who do not even know that they exist.
The Revisionist view also encourages theft. Unlike Eng-
land, where limited sales of stolen goods are protected un-
der the market overt concept,175 America has not adopted
such a rule. Thievery is condemned by penal sanctions and
sound public policy. In fact, the public policy against steal-
ing is so strong that the criminal law was broadened to
make defrauding buyers criminals and reclaiming sellers
171 U.C.C. § 1-201(9); In Re Air Vermont, Inc. 45 B.R. 931, 934
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (sold primarily from inventory).
172 U.C.C. § 2-103(b).
173 Generally, through an abstract company. See Peoples Nat'l Bank
v. Weiner, 514 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (App. Div. 1987).
174 Guy Martin Buick, 519 P.2d at 359 (Colo. 1974).
175 See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF
GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT §347
(1909).
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victims. Under the Model Penal Code, 176 a buyer who ob-
tains goods with no intent to pay for them steals them.7 7 If
the Revisionists are right about how the floating lien credi-
tor behaves, insolvent debtors will order goods with no in-
tention of paying for them just to remain in business.17 8
Further, if floating lien creditors need not "pay" for the
goods by giving fresh value for them, they will not investi-
gate their debtor's rights to them.
Article 2 regulates sellers and buyers. It was not in-
tended and it was not drafted to resolve Code disputes be-
tween reclaiming sellers and secured creditors.
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
The trade creditor knows what his risks are. His secu-
rity is limited. If he has misjudged his debtor, he must act
promptly to avoid the transaction, before a resale buyer is
mislead by his buyer's apparent ownership of the goods.
The Article 9 secured creditor's expectations are clear: he
knows that he can only assert claims to collateral in which
his debtor has "rights."
Through a misreading of the Code, however, the expec-
tations of both kinds of Code creditors have been under-
mined. There is something inherently wrong with a rule
that allows a lender, who never counted on exploiting cer-
176 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2(1) (1980).
177 E.g., State v. Tovar, 580 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Iowa 1998). Something
more than non-performance is needed, however, to establish the
fraudulent intent. M.P.C. § 223.3 cmt.190 (1980). An insolvent buyer
treads perilously close to the line. As one court has pointed out, the
"making of a promise [to pay] will necessarily imply an intent to perform,
the absence of which may itself make a promise false when stated."
United States v. Shah, 44 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1995).
178 Commenting on the classical cash sale doctrine, Article 9 drafter
Grant Gilmore observed that when a buyer bounces a check in a cash
sale, something "more serious than 'mere' fraud is involved, something
approaching theft--'larceny by trick or device.' [C]onsequently, the
defaulting cash sale buyer gets no title and can transfer none to a good
faith purchaser." Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good
Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1060 (1954).
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tain property as collateral, to take it from a person who was
never paid for it.179 Yet this is the effect of the Code's mis-
reading. The stream of commerce becomes a torrent sweep-
ing the unpaid seller away in it.
Unhappy with what Article 9 gave them, secured credi-
tors lobbied for the greater status enjoyed by Article 2 buy-
ers. Treating floating lien creditors like buyers of goods has
undermined the Code's operation by distorting its property
interests. The Article 2 negotiability principles in place
produce a principled outcome for every interest. The re-
claiming seller, his buyer, his buyer's transferees, along
with the greater good are all treated fairly under the Code
as it is presently drafted.
Consider, first, the competing equities just after the
seller delivers the goods, before they are negotiated away
under Article 2. Delivery was made on Seller's expectation
that Buyer would pay for the goods, but Buyer cannot pay
because Buyer is insolvent. Buyer has possession of goods
that, in good conscience, he should not keep and no one has
changed his position in reliance on these goods. If seller
makes his timely reclamation demand' 80 and recovers the
goods, no one will have been prejudiced.' 8 '
Consider now what happens if Seller does not make a
timely demand or if Buyer negotiates the goods to a buyer
179 A "gross injustice," according to Justice Bradley in United States
v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. 362, 365 (1870).
180 Ten days under U.C.C. § 2-702 unless buyer has misrepresented
his solvency in writing "within three months before delivery." If so, the
10-day limit does not apply. Id. at § 2-702(2). Ten day limit exists under
the Bankruptcy Code as well. The demand in bankruptcy, moreover,
must be in writing. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(A). Since no time is specified in
the Code, the reclaiming cash seller must make his demand within a
reasonable time. See U.C.C. § 2-507 cmt. 3 (1989).
181 Allowing the seller to recover equipment from the floating lienor
will produce only "marginal harm" because equipment is often leased and
secured creditors do not rely on it. Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information,
and Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit Seller's Right of Reclamation,
44 UCLA L. Rev. 247, 315 (1996). As for inventory flow, upon which the
floating lien creditor does rely, the seller can deal with it more efficiently
by reselling it--it has expertise here that a lender does not have--and
thus avoid depreciation. Id. at 316.
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in the ordinary course or other good faith buyer. The float-
ing lienor is entitled, without worry from the reclaiming
seller, to all proceeds 8 2 of the sale. Unlike the floating lien
creditor, who relies on proceeds even more than on the
goods that will generate them, 83 seller did not bargain for
proceeds. 84 Hence, seller is not entitled to proceeds, either
by expectation or by Code rule. The Article 2 sales contract
gives the trade creditor only a limited lien against the sold
goods. 185 Beyond that, he stands no higher than the other
general creditors of his buyer.186
The Code affords the reclaiming seller a very narrow
window within which to enforce his property claim. He
must make a timely demand for the goods. Timely demand
or not, if the goods are promptly resold to qualifying buyers,
leased to a subsequent lessee or taken by a secured creditor
for fresh value, the seller's reclamation right will be dam-
aged or destroyed.
Does this outcome fairly balance the equities of the com-
peting parties? Yes, I submit. Like Code paper acquired by
an innocent purchaser, the goods will have been negotiated
away under the more limited Article 2 negotiability policy
that respects the historic nature of goods and the expecta-
tions that people have about exploiting them. The security
182 U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (2000). See § 9-110, which gives priority to a
buyer who becomes an Article 2 secured party over the floating lien
creditor because "the payments giving rise to the debt secured by the
Article 2 ... security interest are likely to be included among the lender's
proceeds." § 9-110 cmt. 4.
183 "Creditors who lend to farmers against crops as security expect
like other inventory lenders to be paid from the proceeds generated
by.. .sale of the inventory." Paul B. Rasor and James B. Wadley,
Agricultural Law Symposium: The Secured Farm Creditor's Interest in
Federal Price Supports: Policies and Priorities, 73 KY. L. J. 595, 663
(1984).
IM His bargain is for a solvent debtor. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v.
Adochio, 138 F.3d 491, 507 (3d Cir. 1998).
185 "Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with
respect to them." U.C.C. § 2-702(3); In re PFA Farmers Market Ass'n.,
583 F.2d 992, 1003 (8th Cir. 1978) (no right to any "deficiency").
186 Under § 2-702(3), successful reclamation "excludes all other
remedies with respect to" the goods.
No. 3:509]
HeinOnline  -- 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 537 2001
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
interest will then attach to their proceeds, property to
which the debtor has "rights" and the reclaiming seller has
none. The trade creditor's bargain was either for a solvent
debtor or the limited reclamation rights that Article 2 gives
him. 8 7
As the Code stands, the reasonable expectations of all
parties involved are met.
V. CONCLUSION
The fate of the Reclaiming seller is in the hands of the
Article 2 Drafting Committee. As things stand now, to
compete, the seller of goods must become more conservative
in his practices, perhaps by mimicking the secured lender
and imposing the additional burdens and costs of that kind
of transaction.
The effect will be to stifle trade credit, and with it, the
small businesses that depend on their sellers to work with
them in channeling goods to the widest possible markets.
187 E.g., In re Landy Beef Co., Inc., 30 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D.
Mass.1983); but see United States v. Westside Bank, 732 F.2d 1258 (5th
Cir. 1984) (whatever proceeds remain after secured creditors are paid);
cf. Ranchers and Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313
(Colo. 1976) (seller entitled to proceeds from auctioneer acting on buyer's
behalf).
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